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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to examine the state of the law in relation to the locus 
standi of representative groups at the Union level. The paper has a dual thematic task: the 
assessment of the degree in which representative groups and their standing to challenge the 
validity of legislative measures can be differentiated from the Plaumann criterion and the 
identification of strategies that can improve the chances of interest groups to challenge under 
Art. 230 EC. The thesis adopted in response states that regrettably the ECJ’s interpretation 
of the requirement of individual concern has been applied to representative groups. After 
examining the jurisprudence in different areas and from the perspective of the arguments 
used by representative groups in order to bypass Plaumann, there does not seem to be any 
clear thematic or argumentative typology that influences the ECJ. The only important 
element that could make a difference is the existence of documented participation by the 
representative body that creates procedural rights. It is in this respect that the removal of the 
individual concern shadow can be achieved, namely through representative groups being 
effective at what they are designed to do: lobbying. Therefore, the key to strengthening the 
standing claim is enhanced and certified participation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The cornerstone of every democratic polity is the adherence to the principle of 
the rule of law which entails the existence of legal mechanisms guaranteeing 
“not only that a court be able to deal with all the violations of legal rules but, in 
addition, that all injured parties be entitled to adjudication of their grievances”.1 
  
 * Lecturer in Law, University of Hull. The author wants to thank Anne Bonnie for 
her comments to an earlier draft and the participants in the ATINER conference in 
Athens, June 2006 where the ideas expressed in this paper were presented in an 
embryonic form. Needless to say, all errors and omissions remain my own. Law School, 
University of Hull, Cottingham Road, HU6 7RX, UK. 
E-mail: C.C.Kombos@hull.ac.uk 
 1 Scheingold, S.: The Rule of Law in European Integration. Connecticut, 1976. 41. 
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The redress of grievances is directly dependent on the existence of facilitative 
instruments for testing the procedural and substantive legality of measures 
adopted by the institutions of that legal order. An essential component of a system 
that provides for the challenge of measures is the capacity to bring actions (or 
locus standi) which acts as the gateway to judicial review proceedings.  
 In the context of the European Union (EU), the capacity of individuals to 
bring actions in order to challenge the validity of secondary Community law 
is formally guaranteed in Art. 230(4) EC. The assessment by commentators 
of the effectiveness of that provision in according standing to individual 
applicants,2 places the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) in an apologetic position.3 The critical perspective against the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ on Art. 230 (4) EC, can be synopsised in the argument 
that the Court construed the requirement of individual concern, the main 
admissibility requirement for actions brought by individual applicants for the 
annulment of Community acts, too restrictively.4 The criticism extends to the 
  
 2 For a selection of accounts on standing see: Harding, C.: The Private Interest in 
Challenging Community Action. 5 (1980) European Law Review, 345; Harlow, C.: Towards 
a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice. 12 (1992) Yearbook of European Law, 
213; Craig, P.: Legality, Standing and Substantial Review in Community Law. 14 (1994) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 507; Rasmussen, H.: Why Is Article 173 Interpreted 
Against Private Plaintiffs? 5 (1980) European Law Review, 112; Arnull, A.: Private 
Applicants and the Action for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty. 32 
(1995) Common Market Law Review. 7; Greaves, R.: Locus Standi under Article 173 EEC 
when Seeking Annulment of a Regulation. 11 (1986) European Law Review, 119; Neuwahl, 
N.: Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC: Past, Present and Possible Future. 21 (1996) European 
Law Review, 112; Arnull, A.: The European Union and its Court of Justice. Oxford, 
1999. 21–69; Ward, A.: Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law. 
Oxford, 2000. 202–287; Albors-Llorens, A.: Private Parties in European Community Law. 
Challenging Community Measures. Oxford, 1996.   
 3 See the critical analysis in Usher, J. A.: Direct and Individual Concern-an Effective 
Remedy or a Conventional Solution? 28 (2003) European Law Review, 575; Albors-
Llorens, A.: The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the 
European Court Missed the Boat? 62 (2003) Cambridge Law Journal, 72; Craig, P.: 
Standing, Rights, and the Structure of Legal Argument. 9 (2003) European Public Law, 
493; Ragolle, F.: Access to Justice for Private Applicants in the Community Legal Order: 
recent (r)evolutions. 28 (2003) European Law Review, 90; Biernat, E.: The Locus Standi of 
Private Applicants under article 230 (4) EC and the Principle of Judicial Protection in the 
European Community. Harvard Jean Monnet Working Section No. 12/03, http://www. 
jeanmonnetprogram.org/sections/03/031201.html 
 4 Granger, M-P.: Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals 
Seeking Judicial Review of Community Acts: Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v Commission and 
Union de Pequeños Agricultores v Council. 66 (2003) Modern Law Review, 124. 
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point that the requirement of individual concern constitutes all but an intractable 
barrier for individual applicants to the extent that it transformed standing from 
a gateway to judicial review to a permanently close door.5 In addition, there is 
also a discrepancy with the jurisprudence of the Court in other fields where 
the ECJ demonstrated a bold willingness to develop important constitutional 
principles.6 The departure from the general strategy of expansion of the enforce-
ment potential of European Community (EC) law when it came to standing, is 
surprising due to the fact that the Court seems to disregard the coexistence with 
the constitutional legal structures of the Member States that guaranty the 
existence of liberal legal mechanisms for challenging the validity of measures 
in their municipal systems.7 
 Unfortunately, the same restrictive approach has been applied to the stand-
ing of representative groups, irrespective of the fact that the Union has recently 
placed its emphasis on the promotion of participation of citizens in the decision-
making process,8 thus resulting to an inconsistency between policy goals of the 
EU and the approach of the ECJ to standing.9 The idea of enhancing participation 
  
 5 For similar views see: Enchelmaier, S.: No-One Slips Through the Net? Latest 
Developments, And Non-Developments, in the European Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence 
on Art. 230(4) EC. Working Paper 3, <http://www.competitionlaw.ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/ 
working3enchelmaier.pdf>, 2; Kombos, C.: The Recent Case Law on Locus Standi of 
Private Applicants under Art. 230 (4) EC: A Missed Opportunity or A Velvet Revolution? 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 9 (2005) <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005- 
017.pdf>, 1. 
 6 E.g. the development of State liability: Pekka, A.: Twelve Years of Francovich in the 
European Court of Justice: A Survey of the Case-law on the Interpretation of the Three 
Conditions of Liability. In: Moreira de Sousa, S.–Heusel, W. (eds.): Enforcing Community 
law from Francovich to Köbler: Twelve Years of the State Liability Principle. Cologne, 
2004. 59.; Arnull, A.: Rights and Remedies: Restraint or Activism? In: Lonbay, J.–Biondi, 
A. (eds.): Remedies for Breach of EC Law. Sussex, 1997. 15.; Barav, A.: State Liability in 
Damages for Breach of Community Law in the National Courts. In: Barav, A.–Wyatt D. A. 
(eds.): Yearbook of European Law 1996. Oxford, 1997. 87. 
 7 For the liberal stand of Member States on standing see, e.g., German law: Bundes-
verwaltungsgericht 1.12.82 BverwGE 66, 307 (crab-fishermen case); Italian law: TAR Lazio, 
20. 1. 95, No 62 Foro Italiano 1995 II-460; Belgian law: Conseil d’État, Ville de Liége et Heze, 
20. 9. 91, No 37.676; French law: Conseil d’État, 24. 6. 91, Soc Côte d’Azur, Lebon, 1110.   
 8 Commission’s White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 European 
Governance-A White Paper, 27 July 2001; Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe, 
December 2001, available <http://www.euconvention.be/static/LaekenDeclaration.asp>. 
For analysis see Armstrong, K.: Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the 
White Paper on Governance. 8 (2002) European Law Journal, 102. 
 9 Cygan, A.: Protecting the Interests of Civil Society in Community Decision-Making–
The Limits of Article 230 EC, 52 (2003) International Comparative Law Quarterly, 995. 
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has inherent links with the operation of representative groups that exercise 
considerable influence at the pre-legislative level through the medium of 
lobbying practices.10 The Commission’s White Paper on European Governance11 
has, according to Curtin, accepted the significant role of representative groups 
in terms of their “dedication to the disinterested search for the public interest in 
society”.12 By a logical expansion of the preceding reasoning, it can be argued 
that there is no compelling reason for limiting the quest for promotion of the 
public interest to the drafting stage of legislation. Cygan has supported this 
approach by suggesting that “representation and protection of citizens’ interests 
requires ex post judicial protection in circumstances where the legislative 
measure breaches fundamental rights or if its application infringes principles 
of procedural propriety”.13 Therefore, it would be paradoxical to insist on the 
functional and democratic utility of representative groups, while simultane-
ously denying any effective standing rights for challenging legislative measures. 
Needless to say, that paradox has become the norm in the sphere of EU law. 
 As a corollary, the purpose of this paper is twofold: to offer a descriptive 
analysis of the development and state of the law in relation to locus standi of 
individuals and representative groups and to examine the possible alternatives 
that could be utilized for sidestepping the hurdles created by the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ and CFI in relation to representative groups. The working hypothesis 
applied states that the state of the law is unduly restrictive and economically 
unrealistic and is likely to remain such because of the recent rulings of the ECJ 
that were effectively reaffirmed and codified by the Draft Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe.14 The alternatives that could be used include the 
  
 10 On the role of interest groups see: Mazey, S.–Richardson, J.: Interest Groups and the 
Brussels Bureaucracy. In: Hayward, J.–Menon, A. (eds.): Governing Europe. Oxford, 2003. 
208.; Bouwen, P.: Corporate Lobbying in the EU: the Logic of Access. 9 (2002) Journal of 
European Public Policy, 365; Eising, R.: Interest Groups and the European Union. In: Cini, 
M. (eds.): European Union Politics. Oxford, 2003. 192. 
 11 Op. cit., note 8. Note that the relationship of the Commission with interest groups 
has a long history as evident from Commission of the European Communities, An Open and 
Structured Dialogue Between the Commission and Special Interest Groups, Brussels, 1992, 
CEC: SEC (92) 2272 final, 2 December 1992; Commission of the European Communities 
and Council of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on 
Promoting The Role of Voluntary Organisations and Foundations in Europe, COM (97) 241 
final. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997. 
 12 Curtin, D.: Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political 
Philosophy. The Hague, 1997. 90. 
 13 Cygan: op. cit., 995. 
 14 Available <http://europa.eu/constitution/futurum/constitution/index_en.htm> 
 LOCUS STANDI OF REPRESENTATIVE GROUPS IN THE SHADOW OF PLAUMANN  377 
  
agency analogy that refers to the collective challenging through pressure groups15 
and the enhanced participation at the drafting level that would aim at creating 
procedural rights of challenge that would be enforceable on the basis of legitimate 
expectations. The preceding proposals apply primarily to representative groups 
but could function as the bridge for relaxing standing requirements in general or 
more realistically for expanding the scope of exceptions to Plaumann. 
 In terms of terminological completeness, it must be clarified that the denomi-
nation ‘representative groups’ is a generic term encompassing a plethora of 
different types of groups. Those cover a broad thematic spectrum ranging from 
pressure groups for specific interests (e.g. environmental groups), representa-
tive groups of sections of the economy (e.g. industrialists) and of workers (trade 
unions). The nature of each representative group impacts on the approach that 
the ECJ and the CFI adopt as will be shown infra, with the stringent approach 
reserved for environmental groups and for bodies that base their claims on 
fundamental human rights. At the other side of the continuum, there are those 
bodies that can establish participatory rights flowing from procedural grounds. 
The other term used by this paper is ‘surrogate actions’ that refers to actions that 
are intentionally brought by groups in instances where an individual applicant 
would fail due to the Plaumann criteria.  
 In structural terms, the paper is divided in three sections: the necessary 
sketching of the existing state of the law, the approach of the ECJ and the CFI 
towards different types of representative groups and the assessment of different 
strategies that could potentially reverse the unsatisfactory legal framework. 
 
 
2.  Locus standi under Art. 230 EC: the Plaumann shadow 
 
Art. 230 EC establishes a trichotomy between different types of applicants 
seeking to challenge the validity of acts of the institutions, alas without 
distinguishing between forms of measures,16 thus covering both legislative and 
administrative acts of the Community institutions.17 Moreover, Art. 230 EC 
  
 15 For an excellent introductory analysis see Douglas-Scott, S.: Constitutional Juris-
prudence of the European Union. London, 2002. 363–368. 
 16 Albors-Llorens, A.: Private Parties in European Community Law. Challenging 
Community Measures. Oxford, 1996. 4, 6.  
 17 Ibid., 5. For the comparison with national systems see Fromont. M.: L’influence du 
Droit français et du Droit allemande sur les Conditions de Recevabilité du Recours en 
Annulation devant la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes. 2 (1966) Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Européenne, 47.  
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draws a rigid distinction between legal entities based on the identity of the 
applicant,18 therefore establishing a typological approach whereby there are 
privileged, semi-privileged and non-privileged applicants. These classes have 
in common only the general conditions of Art. 230 (1) EC, namely the act must 
be an act of an EC Institution19 that produces legal effects,20 and the challenge 
must be brought within the two-month time limit.21 On this basis, Art. 230 EC 
adopts an approach of selective actio popularis in the sense privileged applicants 
have automatic standing to challenge measures adopted by the Institutions,22 
while the semi-privileged class can take action against other institutions only 
for the purpose of protecting their prerogative powers.23 
 
  
 18 Hartley, T.: The Foundations of EC Law. Oxford, 1998. 349–350. 
 19 Institutions whose acts are excluded by Art. 230 (1) are the European Council, 
COREPER and the Council when acting under intergovernmental powers: Case T-584/93, 
Roujansky v. European Council, [1994] European Court Reports, II-585; Case C-25/94, 
Commission v. Council (FAO), [1996] European Court Reports, I-1469; Cases C-181, 248/91, 
Parliament v. Council and Commission (Aid to Bangladesh), [1993] European Court 
Reports, I-3685. 
 20 A relevant concept is to be found in the landmark decision in Case 22/70, ERTA, 
[1971] European Court Reports, 263: the list of acts that can be reviewed in Art. 249 EC is 
not exhaustive and other acts that are sui generis in nature can be reviewed, provided that 
they have legal effects. See also Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission, [1981] European Court 
Reports, 2639, Case T-3/93, Air France v. Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, II-
121. See also the recent decision in Case C-131/03 P, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v 
Commission, Official Journal 2003 C124/10, delivered on 12th September 2006. 
 21 Starts from the moment that the measure in question is published or from the 
moment that the applicant is notified: Case 156/77, Commission v Belgium, [1978] European 
Court Reports, 1881; Cases 10 & 18/68, Eridania v Commission, [1969] European Court 
Reports, 459; Case C-195/91 P, Bayer AG v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, 
I-5619. 
 22 Privileged applicants: Member States, Commission, Council and after the Treaty of 
Nice the European Parliament. On the gradual change to the standing rights of the EP see 
C-302/87, European Parliament v. Council (Comitology), [1988] European Court Reports, 
5615, Case C-70/88 European Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl), [1990] European Court 
Reports, I-2041. For comment see Weiler, J.: Pride and Prejudice–Parliament v. Council. 
14 (1989) European Law Review, 334.; Bebr, G.: The Standing of the EP in the Com-
munity system of Legal Remedies: A Thorny Jurisprudential Development. (1990) 10 
YBEL 171. 
 23 Semi-privileged: ECB and the Court of Auditors. See Craig, P.: EMU, the European 
Central Bank and Judicial Review. In: Beaumont–Walker (eds.): Legal Framework of the 
Single Currency. Oxford, 1999. 112.  
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 Any natural or legal person can challenge the validity of a measure on the 
basis of Art. 230 (4) EC, provided that the measure is one described as within 
the scope of the provision and that the dual requirement of ‘direct and individual 
concern’ is satisfied. Direct concern is an unproblematic test of causation whereby 
the applicant needs to show that he is affected by the contested measure and 
that there is no discretionary implementing measure breaking the chain.24 In 
terms of individual concern when challenging decisions addressed to a third 
party, it was held in the landmark decision in Plaumann v. Commission25 that 
a claimant is individually concerned if the decision in question “affects them 
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by 
virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually”.26 Therefore, the Court 
construed the individual concern requirement as a two-part test requiring that 
the claimant is differentiated from all other persons and that by reasons of those 
distinguishing features the claimant is singed out as the original addressee of 
the decision. 
 In Plaumann the application of the test to the specific facts made the test 
even more narrow and demanding and in effect created a third requirement. 
The Court ruled that the claimant is affected by the decision because he was an 
importer of clementines but could not be singled out in the same way as the 
original addressee as in the future any individual could enter in the practice 
of the specific commercial activity. It becomes therefore clear that the ECJ 
introduced an additional test in terms of the singled out requirement by requiring 
that the claimant has to satisfy the dual test not only at the present but also 
show that the same would apply in the future.  
 The ‘future element’ represents a constraint that renders the individual concern 
requirement almost impossible to satisfy since the Court starts from the premise 
that at any moment in the future any individual could decide and enter the 
specific commercial circle. Clearly, that is an argument that in effect ignores 
fundamental principles of economic activity according to which the entry into 
  
 24 Case 62/70, Bock v. Commission, [1971] European Court Reports, 897.; Case 11/82, 
Piraiki–Patraiki v. Commission, [1985] European Court Reports, 207.; Case T-96/92, Comité 
central d’entreprise de la Société générale des grande sources v. Commission, [1995] 
European Court Reports, II-1213 and Case T-12/93, Comité central d’entreprise de la Société 
anonyme Vittel v. Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, II-1247. See Hartley: op. 
cit. 369–373; Craig, P.–De Bùrca, G.: EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford, 2003. 
518–520. 
 25 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, [1963] European Court Reports, 95. 
 26 Ibid., para. 107. 
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a market is not always open to anybody but is restricted by a plethora of 
factors. Those could include the strength of existing and established competitors, 
the growth potential of the market, the significance of established brands and a 
number of other factors that are beyond the scope of this work.27 
 The restrictive nature of the Plaumann formula has been confirmed in 
numerous subsequent decisions that can be placed in two categories: (i) appli-
cation of Plaumann leading to “economically unrealistic”28 results, and (ii) 
‘generous’ application in a retroactive context.29 In terms of challenging 
regulations, Art. 230 (4) EC allows for the challenge of regulations that are in 
essence decisions and the relevant requirement is again that of direct and 
individual concern, with Plaumann supplemented in Calpak30 and the test whether 
a regulation is of general application or specific application.31 Therefore, the 
economically unfounded and unrealistic approach of the ECJ in relation to the 
criteria applied in Plaumann has been applied in the context of regulations, 
regrettably reinforced with the additional requirement that the regulations have 
specific application.32 Once again, a limited exception applies for occasions 
where the factual background is placed in the past and the set of events was 
  
 27 A good starting point for appreciating the economic unstableness of the “future” 
requirement is the seminal work by Porter, M.: How competitive forces shape strategy.  59 
(1979) Harvard Business Review. In brief, there are 5 forces that influence a firm's 
competitive strategy. Four forces–the bargaining power of customers, the bargaining power 
of suppliers, the threat of new entrants, and the threat of substitute products–combine with 
other variables to influence a fifth force, the level of competition in an industry.  
 28 Craig–De Bùrca: op. cit., 489. See for examples the decisions in Case 231/82, Spijker 
Kwasten v. Commission, [1983] European Court Reports, 2559. 
 29 See for example Cases 106–107/63, Toepfer v. Commission, [1965] European Court 
Reports, 405, 411. “the membership of the class is fixed and ascertainable at the date of 
the adoption of the contested measure”. See also Case 11/82, Piraiki–Patraiki v. Commission, 
[1985] European Court Reports, 207. 
 30 Cases 789–790/79, Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v. 
Commission, [1980] European Court Reports, 1949. 
 31 Ibid., para. 9. For criticism see Craig–De Bùrca: op. cit., 494; Craig, P.: Standing , 
Rights, and the Structure of Legal Argument. 9 (2003) European Public Law, 495. 
 32 Case 101/76, KSH v. Commission, [1977] European Court Reports, 797; Cases 103-
9/78 Beauport v. Council and Commission, [1979] European Court Reports, 17; Case 162/78, 
Wagner v. Commission, [1979] European Court Reports, 3467; Case 45/81, Alexander Moksel 
Import-Export GmbH v. Commission, [1982] European Court Reports, 1129; Cases 97, 
99, 193 and 215/86, Asteris AE and Greece v. Commission, [1988] European Court 
Reports, 2181. 
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completed,33 thus creating inconsistency through the weak technical dichotomy 
between the Calpak rule and the exception.34  
 The inconsistency is strengthened by the development of subject matter 
exceptions where the Court has relaxed the standing requirements applying to 
challenges of regulations that are disguised decisions. The five subject matter 
areas are de facto exceptions to the restrictive interpretation of individual 
concern, as it is evident from the case law in the fields of anti-dumping,35 state 
aid,36 competition,37 trademark rights38 and instances where a democratic con-
sideration is present.39  
 As an interim conclusion, the approaches of the ECJ and the CFI in inter-
preting Art. 230 (4) EC and the requirement of individual concern have been 
extremely restrictive and narrow. The decision in Plaumann is highly problematic 
  
 33 Case 100/74, Societe CAM v. Commission [1975] European Court Reports, 1393; 
Cases 41-44/70, International Fruit Company BV v. Commission, [1971] European Court 
Reports, 411. 
 34 Cf. Case 138/79, Roquette Frères v. Council, [1980] European Court Reports, 3333; C-
152/88, Sofrimport Sarl v. Commission, [1990] European Court Reports, I-2477 with Cases 
789–790/79, Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v. Commission, 
[1980] European Court Reports, 1949; Case 11/82, Piraiki–Patraiki v. Commission, [1985] 
European Court Reports, 207. 
 35 Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council and the Commission, [1979] 
European Court Reports, 1185; Cases 239, 275/82 Allied Corporation v. Commission, [1984] 
ECR-1005; Case 264/82, Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission, [1985] European 
Court Reports, 849; C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, [1992] European Court 
Reports, I-3813. See the Opinion by AG Jacobs in Extramet, para. 33 where he states “Nor 
do I believe it is necessary, in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion, to make direct 
reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, on which Extramet places some 
reliance in these proceedings. The Convention and the laws of the Member States are, 
however, indirectly relevant in that they support the existence of a general principle of law, 
namely the right to an effective judicial remedy: see Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief 
Constable of the RUC, [1986] European Court Reports, 1651; Case 222/86, Unectef v. 
Heylens, [1987] European Court Reports, 4097. In my view, Article 173 should be 
interpreted so as to give effect to that principle”. 
 36 Case 169/84, COFAZ v. Commission, [1984] European Court Reports, 391;Case 
C-198/91, William Cock plc v. Commission, [1993] European Court Reports, I-2486; Case 
730/79, Phillip Morris Holland BV v. Commission, [1980] European Court Reports, 2671. 
 37 Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Groâmärkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission, [1977] ECR 
1875. 
 38 Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v Council, [1994] European Court Reports, I-1853. 
 39 Case 294/83, Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament, [1986] ECR-1339. See 
Craig, P.: Democracy and Rule-making within the EC: An Empirical and Normative 
Assessment. 3 (1997) European Law Journal 105. 
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leading the subsequent case law to take the form of an anthology of examples 
of missed opportunities, economically unrealistic criteria, absurd outcomes and 
exceptions that are in reality further elaborations on and confirmations of the 
strictness of the tests. Unfortunately, those problematic parameters of individual 
concern for third parties were transplanted to challenges by representative groups. 
 
 
3. Actions by representative groups and the Plaumann shadow 
 
3.1. Representative groups, the symbiotic relation with the institutions and  
  their constitutional role 
 
The preceding section pictured the unduly restrictive and limited approach to 
standing that has been severely criticized40 for its economic naivety and lack of 
protection for the individual. It is, therefore, interesting to examine whether 
the Court has adopted a different approach in relation to representative groups 
that bring actions on behalf of their membership. If the approach of the Courts 
is more liberal than that adopted for individual applicants, then there is an 
effective alternative circumventing the Plaumann test and its expansion in the 
jurisprudence. This is the rationale behind the agency analogy.     
 The agency analogy refers to the use of group actions as a medium for 
challenging the validity of measures where the individual applicant would 
normally fail due to the interpretation of the individual concern requirement 
in the case law.41 Therefore, the idea of surrogate actions could provide an 
effective alternative for bypassing the consistent restrictive approach of the 
ECJ and the CFI in relation standing under Art. 230 (4) EC. The main theme of 
this section is whether it is desirable and justifiable to have a two-tier approach 
reserved for representative groups and other private applicants. 
 One dimension of the debate perceives representative groups as having 
extraordinary opportunities to intervene and influence the nature, content and 
scope of legislative measures. The influencing power of representative groups 
has been described as symbiotic with the Commission,42 with the latter depending 
on representative groups for expert advice, technical expertise and for offering 
cross-national advocacy coalitions that are essential for the successful introduction 
  
 40 See the thorough analysis by Enchelmaier, S.: op. cit. 
 41 For an influential account supporting a reversal of the case law see Usher, J.: Judicial 
Review of Community Acts and the Private Litigant. In: Campbell, A.–Voyatzi, M. (eds.): 
Legal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of Community Law. Trenton, 1996, 121.  
 42 Mazey–Richardson: op. cit., 209. 
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of legislative proposals.43 Consequently, such groups already have a dispropor-
tionately prominent role that generates influence impacting on the substance of 
legislative measures. Therefore, is seems unjust and democratically dispropor-
tionate for representative groups to have a special treatment reserved for them in 
the context of legal challenges.44 Moreover, it has been argued45 that associational 
standing is undesirable because it could be exploited by associations at the 
expense of the ‘Hohfeldian claimant’.46 Such type of claimant can be defined 
as the applicant that has a material claim correlative to a distinct obligation in 
another person or entity, while an interest group has an ideological claim.47 
Therefore, the argument is based on the subset of rules that Hohfeld identified 
in a legal system that have the functional task of regulating and directing the 
behaviour of the subjects of the system, namely individuals and associations, 
through prohibiting and stipulating what those agents are required by law to 
do. If an association takes advantage of the subset of rules that grants standing 
rights on the basis of a broad right to participation and at the same time the 
individuals with a concrete interest in challenging a measure are effectively 
excluded from doing so by the rules of the subsystem, then there is a legitimacy 
gap. In other words, the ideological right of associations to standing is placed 
at an equal level with the right of an individual to challenge where there is a 
vital interest at stake, or alternatively at a higher level if the individual is 
effectively denied of a standing right.48 
 The problem is magnified by the fact that the ECJ has persistently applied 
the strict Plaumann criteria to actions brought by private applicants. The creation 
of an exception favoring representative groups would create an unnecessary 
and unjustified dichotomy that would be creating the assumption that the 
individual deserves and receives protection of a lower intensity.49 The con-
sequences for the legitimacy and authority of the Union’s judicial architecture 
would be negative and undesirable, since a double-standard yardstick would 
be seen as applying. At a practical level, the objection is that a liberal approach 
to the standing of representative groups could result in the creation of the 
  
 43 Ibid. 409–410, 415. 
 44 Harlow, C.: Public Law and Popular Justice. 65 (2002) Modern Law Review, 13. 
 45 Douglas-Scott: op. cit., 367. 
 46 Term used to describe the ideas expressed by Hohfeld, W. N.: Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning [ed: Cook, W. W., Yale University Press]. 
New Haven and London, 1919. 
 47 Douglas-Scott: op. cit., 367. 
 48 Tushnet, M.: The Sociology of Article III: a Response to Professor Brilmayar. 93 
(1983) Harvard Law Review, 698. 
 49 Cygan: op. cit., 996. 
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phenomenon of “busybodies or meddlesome organizations”.50 As a corollary, 
the workload of the courts would increase, the legal certainty would be under-
mined as legislative measures would not be effective in practice until the time 
limit for challenge expires and the danger of test cases or delaying challenges 
from financially powerful bodies would be immanent. 
  On a different level, the creation of an exceptional class of private applicants 
in the form of representative groups could upset the delicate institutional 
balance. This is the case because according to Harlow51 judicial review could 
be substituted by political accountability in the sense that legal challenges are to 
be made possible against policy decisions. In other words, the representative 
groups’ function is not to second-guess informed policy decisions made under 
the complex legislative process when the result of their lobbying has proved to 
be unsuccessful. The democratic processes could, therefore, be bypassed with 
the practical consequence of placing the unelected judiciary at the difficult 
position of deciding cases that are in practice reviews of policy questions. 
 Finally, the argumentation against expanding standing rights for association 
groups includes a practical element that refers to the “repeat player phenomenon” 
and the “saga approach”, whereby associations initiate repeatedly challenges 
and apply a systematic attack approach on a specific policy.52 The consequence 
of the actions of such representative bodies would be the increase in the 
workload of the courts, while at the same time there seems to be an unjustified 
and disproportionate capitalization on the politically influential and expanding 
negotiating power of interest groups. 
 The opposite line of reasoning counters the latter point by pointing to the 
fact that judicial review is not isolated from the policy level and the judges 
have arguably the sensitivity of restraint in areas of pure policy determinations. 
Moreover, it is practically intricate to distinguish between administrative 
decisions and policy decisions, with the example of the Greenpeace case53 
proving the point. There, the issue was the funding of a power station that was 
on the face of the record in breach of the environmental safeguards provided 
under EU law. At which point does the policy element end and the administrative 
element begin? Or, can it be argued that the issue is purely a policy matter or 
alternatively solely an administrative propriety topic? Solving the Gordian 
  
 50 Ibid. 
 51 Harlow: Public Law and Popular Justice. op. cit., 13.; Harlow, C.: Towards a Theory 
of Access for the ECJ. 12 (1992) Yearbook of European Law, 213.  
 52 Harding: op. cit., 116. 
 53 Case T-585/93, Greenpeace v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, II-2205. 
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knot of demarcation must be entrusted to the judiciary otherwise judicial review 
would be ab initio externally limited.  
 On a different point, the argument about placing representative groups higher 
than individuals in terms of standing must be approached with the pragmatic 
factor of an overly restrictive approach to standing of private applicants in mind. 
Therefore, the main issue is whether it is productive to maintain a legal lacuna 
in standing on the basis of a theoretically valid principle of equal treatment. It is 
submitted that the persistent unwillingness of the ECJ to reform the Plaumann 
criteria as was reaffirmed in the UPA54 and Jègo-Quèrè55 decisions and by Art. 
III-365 DTC56 creates a pragmatically persuasive reason for relaxing standing 
requirements at any given opportunity through the creation of exceptions. 
The outcome is not ideal but is preferable than a stagnated cu-de-sac. 
 In relation to the workload concern,57 it can be argued that the experience of 
national legal orders with a liberal approach to the standing of representative 
groups has not shown any increase in the workload of the national courts.58 
At the same time, the busybody phenomenon can be preempted since there is 
no argument supporting an actio popularis for representative groups, but a 
balanced test that distinguishes between representative groups with a genuine 
interest and those bodies that have a diametrically opposite agenda. The 
experience of national legal orders and the United Kingdom in specific that is 
analysed infra, points to the existence of such solutions. 
 As an interim conclusion, there are reasons of principle against the creation 
of a dual approach to standing of representative groups and individual appli-
cants, but those arguments have to be approached in a holistic manner that 
takes into account the pragmatic limitations to standing and the need to create 
exceptions to the application of the Plaumann criteria until a new trend is 
created.    
  
 54 Case C-50/2000 P, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council [2002] European Court 
Reports, I-6677 (hereafter “UPA”). 
 55 Case C-263/02 P, Commission v Jègo-Quèrè [2004] CMLR 12 (hereafter “Jègo-Quèrè 
Appeal”). 
 56 For analysis see Kombos, C.: The Recent Case Law on Locus Standi of Private 
Applicants under Art. 230 (4) EC: A Missed Opportunity or A Velvet Revolution? European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 9 (2005) N° 17, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-
017.pdf>, 14–16; Varju, M.: The Debate on the Future of the Standing under Article 
230(4) TEC in the European Convention. (2004) 10 (1) European Public Law 42. 
 57 As expressed by the CFI in Case T-585/93, Greenpeace v Commission, [1995] European 
Court Reports, II-2205, 2230–2232.  
 58 Conclusion reached by Cygan: op. cit., 1000. 
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3.2. Representative groups and standing: the ECJ and the English approach 
  compared 
 
The jurisprudence of the ECJ is very restrictive towards representative groups 
and the Court has persistently refused to create an exception to the Plaumann 
approach when a representative group has sought to challenge under Art. 230 (4) 
EC.59 Accordingly, the position has been summarized by the CFI in Associazone 
Nazionale Bieticotori v. Council60 where it was held that interest bodies are 
able to bring actions under Art. 230 (4) EC when: a legal provision expressly 
grants procedural powers to trade associations;61 the members of the association 
would have been able to bring individual actions as a result of being directly 
and individually concerned;62 the associations negotiating position has been 
affected by the challenged legislative measure, thus attributing to the association 
direct and individual concern as an entity.63    
 This is partly surprising because groups have evolved to be a highly active 
and integral part of the legislative process and have been perceived as a remedial 
tool for the representative/democratic deficit of the Union.64 Moreover, there is 
a comparative paradox in the sense that the development of the state of the law 
in Member States reflects a favorable disposition towards standing in general65 
and surrogate groups especially when those groups seek to initiate judicial 
review actions.66 
  
 59 See Cases 16,17/62, Conféderation Nationale des fruits et Producteures des fruits et 
Légumes v Council, [1962] European Court Reports, 471. See also Cygan: op. cit., 1003–
1005. 
 60 Case T-38/98, Associazone Nazionale Bieticotori v. Council, [1998] European Court 
Reports, II-4191, para. 25. 
 61 Case 191/82 Fediol v Commission, [1983] European Court Reports, 2913, paragraphs 
28 to 30; Case T-12/93, Comité Central d'Entreprise de la Société Anonyme de Vittel and 
Others v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, II-1247, paras. 39–42 
 62 Joined Cases T-447/93, T-448/93 and T-449/93, AITEC and Others v Commission, 
[1995] European Court Reports, II-1971, para. 62. 
 63 Joined Cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85 Van der Kooy and Others v Commission 
[1988] European Court Reports, 219, paras. 21–24; Joined Cases T-481/93 and T-484/93 
Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission [1995] European 
Court Reports, II-2941, para. 64. 
 64 Sudbery, I.: Bridging the Legitimacy Gap in the EU: Can Civil Society Help to Bring 
the Union Closer to its Citizens. 26 (2003) Collegium, 75. 
 65 Conclusion reached by Cygan: op. cit., 997. 
 66 For the liberal stand of Member States on standing see, e.g., German law: Bundes-
verwaltungsgericht 1.12.82 BverwGE 66, 307 (crab-fishermen case); Italian law: TAR Lazio, 
20.1.95, No 62 Foro Italiano 1995 II-460; Belgian law: Conseil d’État, Ville de Liége et 
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  In the English context, the modern origins of granting standing to surrogate 
groups can be found in the Greenpeace (No.2)67 ruling, where Greenpeace sought 
to challenge a decision by the Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) that granted 
a variation in the license of BNFL, a company reprocessing nuclear waste, 
enabling the company to expand its operations in its plant in Cumbria. HMIP 
argued that Greenpeace had no standing as it could not show sufficient interest 
in the decision made, but the judgment by Otton J rejected that argument and 
held that a representative action could be brought by Greenpeace because there 
was a geographical proximity element. In other words, the deciding factor was 
the existence of 2,500 members of Greenpeace in the Cumbria area, thus 
establishing a sufficient interest in the decision that extended the license to 
processing of nuclear waste.68   
 In contrast to the pragmatic approach of Otton J in Greenpeace (No.2), the 
Pergau Dam69 decision represents an expansion in the sense that a more 
theoretically holistic and constitutionally sound reasoning was deployed for 
justifying the granting of standing to representative groups. The issue was the 
legality of a decision to use funds from the overseas aid budget for financing 
the building of the Pergau dam in Malaysia. The World Development Movement 
(WDM), an organization concerned with the distribution of aid, challenged the 
decision on the basis that the project was not going to be beneficial for the 
Malaysian economy and did not represent good value for the British taxpayer. 
The legal basis for the action was the failure of the Foreign Secretary to adhere 
to the provisions of the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980 that 
enabled the financing subject to the existence of a purpose of promoting the 
development or maintaining the economy of an overseas country. Moreover, 
section 1 of the preceding Act limited funding to situations that it was of an 
economically sound nature.70  
                                                      
Heze, 20.9.91, No 37.676; French law: Conseil d’État, 24.6.91, Soc Côte d’Azur, Lebon, 
1110.  
 67 R v Inspectorate of Pollution and another, Ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No.2), [1994] 4 
All ER 329.  
 68 Analysis by Harlow: Public Law and Popular Justice. op. cit. 4 et seq.; Cygan: op. 
cit., 998–1000. 
 69 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ex parte World Development Movement 
Ltd, [1995] 1 All Englis Reports, 611. 
 70 Section 1 of the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980: “The Secretary of 
State has the power, for the purposes of promoting the development or maintaining the 
economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, to furnish any person or 
body with financial or technical assistance”.  
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 The judgment by Rose LJ concentrated on the constitutionally focal position 
of judicial review in a legal system and the essential function of judicial 
review as the guarantor of effective accountability of governmental agencies 
that includes both substantive and procedural fairness in decision-making 
processes.71 Therefore, the fact that the action by the WDM was the only 
available legal challenge to the executive action in this instance was a relevant 
and significant consideration in ensuring that effective governmental account-
ability required under the constitutional rule.72 The existence of technical 
legalistic requirements that could prevent access to a court in circumstances 
where no other legal action was possible,73 was discarded by Rose LJ in the 
exact way that Lord Diplock regarded such obstacles as grave legal lacunae in 
a dissenting judgment in the ex part Federation of Small Businesses case.74 
Moreover, Rose LJ held that the specific characteristics of the pressure group 
were such that distinguished it from meddlesome busybodies, since WDM had 
showed in the past an active and constructive involvement in the distribution of 
aid.75 The lack of an impact on the membership of WDM akin to that present 
in the Greenpeace (No.2) case was not a determinant factor because of the 
interests of accountability, the absence of other potential challengers and the 
evident expertise and prominent role of the organization in the field of 
development aid.76 
 It is, therefore, apparent that there is a favorable approach towards interest 
groups in the English context that is not adopting an actio popularis yardstick, 
but which is distinguishing between groups that have a contribution to make in 
the effectiveness of the process of judicial review. Therefore, the argument that 
a ‘repeat player’ could take advantage of a more liberal approach to the 
standing of surrogate groups to initiate actions that range from test cases to 
time wasting, delaying actions, can be rejected as simplistic. Moreover, the 
possibility of creating a system that would encourage the ‘saga strategy’ is 
again remote because each case is examined individually and the decision 
  
 71 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ex parte World Development Movement 
Ltd, [1995] 1 All ER 611, 619. For analysis see Tomkins, A.: Judges Dam(n) the Govern-
ment. 7 (1996–1997) Kings College Law Journal 91; Harlow: Public Law and Popular Justice. 
op. cit., 4 et seq; Cygan: op. cit., 998–1000. 
 72 Ibid., 620. 
 73 Ibid., 619. 
 74 IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd, [1982] 2 AC 
617, 620. 
 75 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ex parte World Development Movement 
Ltd, [1995] 1 All ER 611, 620. 
 76 Ibid. 
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whether an interest group has standing in the specific case depends on a 
combination of tests that seek to establish the existence of a genuine interest.77  
 The problem created is the formation of a dichotomy of approaches to the 
standing of interests groups, with national courts and the ECJ adopting 
diametrically opposed methodologies and rationales. The national courts favor 
a structured and liberal stand that aims at the improvement of the effectiveness 
of the process of judicial review and of its purposes, while at the same time 
appreciating the increased participatory role of interest groups in modern 
society. On the other hand, the ECJ adopts a rigid approach founded on the 
perception that there can be no distinction between individual applicants and 
interests groups in terms of standing, thus applying the Plaumann criteria to 
surrogate actions. As a corollary, the extremely narrow and restrictive tests 
applicable to the actions of annulment under the ECJ’s interpretation of Art. 
230 (4) EC are applied to the actions by interest groups, on the basis that indi-
vidual concern must be proved in accordance with Plaummann. The dichotomy 
of approach leads to the application of double standards and inconsistency, 
with national courts granting standing to interest groups that challenge national 
legislation for incompatibility with Community law, while the same group 
would not have standing to challenge a Community legislative measure. In R v. 
S.S. for Employment, ex part EOC78 it was held that the Equal Opportunities 
Commission had standing to challenge the compatibility of an Act of Parliament 
with Art. 141 EC, which contrasts with the persistent denial of standing to 
pressure groups by the ECJ that is represented in the Po Delta judgment.79 
 
3.3. Representative groups in the environmental context  
 
In the Po Delta case the CFI80 this time and later the ECJ81 on appeal rejected 
the application of agriculturists and other affiliated associations seeking to 
challenge a Decision approving an EU funded plan for the environmental 
protection of their local area. The CFI concluded that the applicants were not 
in any way differentiated from the other residents of the area, because the 
  
 77 See Harding: op. cit., 116. 
 78 R v. S.S. for Employment, ex part EOC, 2 [1994] Weekly Law Reports, 409.  
 79 Infra. 
 80 Case T-117/94, Associazione Agricoltori della provincial di Rovigo et al. v. 
Commission (Po Delta), [1995] European Court Reports, II-455. 
 81 On Appeal the ECJ confirmed: Case C-142/95 P, Associazione Agricoltori della 
provincial di Rovigo et al. v. Commission (Po Delta), [1996] European Court Reports, I-
6669. 
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effect of the plan on the agriculturists would have been the same with the 
effect on any other citizens living in the area. More significantly, it was stated 
that “it cannot be accepted as a principle that an association, in its capacity as 
the representative of a category of traders, is individually concerned by a measure 
affecting the general interests of that category”.82 Therefore, an association/in-
terest group was equated with individual applicants and no special status was 
given to the association in terms of the Plaumann requirements.  
 In an analogous ruling, in Danielson v. Commission83 an application for 
interim measures brought by residents of Tahiti in relation to nuclear tests 
undertaken by France was found to be inadmissible under Art. 34 EURATOM. 
The fact that they could show the possibility or likelihood of serious physical 
or economic harm84 was not enough for establishing individual concern as they 
applicants were not in any way differed from the residents of the island as a 
whole.85 In more detail, it was held that “even the assumption that the applicants 
might suffer personal damage linked to the alleged harmful effects of the 
nuclear tests in question on the environment or on the health of the general 
public, that circumstance alone would not be sufficient to distinguish them 
individually in the same way as a person to whom the contested decision is 
addressed”.86 The factual circumstances of the case and the unequivocal 
rejection of the claim of the applicants, irrespective of the logical argument 
that there is an actual threat to the health of the residents, has triggered 
negative criticisms of the strictness of the approach of the CFI.87  
 The landmark Greenpeace88 decision is representative of the approach of 
the Court and a brief description of the factual background is necessary in 
  
 82 Po Delta, op. cit., note 80, 466. 
 83 Case T-461/93, Danielson v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, II-3051. 
 84 Ibid., para. 69. 
 85 Ibid., para. 70. 
 86 Ibid., para. 71. 
 87 See Betlem, G.: Being ‘Directly and Individually Concerned’, the Schutznorm Doctrine 
and Francovich Liability. In: Reich, N.–Micklitz, H. (eds.): Public Interest Litigation 
Before European Courts. Baden-Baden, 1996. 319. 
 88 Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council v Commission, [1998] European 
Court Reports, I-1651 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Greenpeace Appeal’). For the Opinion 
of AG Cosmas the same reference applies and for the CFI’s ruling see Case T-585/93, 
Greenpeace and others v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, II-2205 (hereafter 
referred to as ‘Greenpeace’). For an excellent analysis see Torrens, D.: Locus Standi for 
Environmental Associations under EC law-Greenpeace-A Missed Opportunity for the ECJ. 
8 [1999] Reciel 336.  
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order to present the standard type situation when a surrogate organization 
brings an action for annulment.  
 Three environmentalist groups and local residents of the Canary Islands 
challenged the legality of a bundle of Commission Decisions that granted aid 
from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in order to contribute 
to the construction of two power stations. The allocation of funds from the 
ERDF is governed by Art. 7 of Regulation 2052/8889 that requires that the 
distribution of funds complies with the purposes and provisions of the EU 
legal order, including environmental protection. Conformity with the preceding 
provision is ensured through the requirement that an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) should be carried out, but such an assessment was not com-
missioned. Subsequently, the first of four installments was paid to the Spanish 
Government in 1993, thus triggering the challenge by Greenpeace before a 
Spanish court, with the purpose of declaring the payment to be illegal and 
stopping further payments. The action was unsuccessful because the doctrine 
of Foto-Frost90 prevents national courts from declaring a Community act 
invalid, but it is interesting to note that the Greenpeace’s action was dismissed 
not because of lack of standing but due to the nature of the measure that was 
challenged and the limitations imposed by the ECJ in Foto-Frost. On this point, 
AG Cosmas in his Opinion stated that “I do not see in what way the issue of the 
legality of that decision could be raised in the context of national proceedings. 
Those proceedings can concern only the lawfulness of the administrative 
authorizations granted for construction of the electricity-generating power 
stations, or of the environmental impact assessment”.91 
 The next step for Greenpeace was to initiate action before the CFI on the 
basis that the provisions of the Environmental Impact Directive92 were not 
complied with prior to the payment of the first installment, because there was 
no Environmental Impact Assessment carried out.93 Greenpeace also raised 
the point that it had raised this failure in communications to the Commission 
both prior and after the payment of the installment.94 The applicants argued 
that the CFI must adopt a liberal approach to standing in the present case 
  
 89 Official Journal L 185, 15. 7. 1988. 9. 
 90 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, [1987] ECR-4199. 
 91 Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council v Commission, [1998] European Court 
Reports, I-1651, Opinion, para. 74. 
 92 Directive 85/337/EEC, 27 June 1985, Official Journal 1985, L 175/40. 
 93 Case T-585/93, Greenpeace and others v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, 
II-2205, para. 25. 
 94 Ibid., paras. 10, 13. 
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because their interest is in the protection of the environment and not of an 
economic nature.95 Moreover, the applicants stated that the membership of the 
association were individually concerned, thus creating a logical need to allow 
the association to represent their interests.96 Alternatively, the applicants claimed 
that their focused and coordinated involvement during the stage of legal control 
differentiated them from other potential applicants.97 
 The CFI dismissed the application based on the lack of individual concern98 
in accordance with Plaumann as manifested in the failure of the applicants to 
show that they were different from all other individuals resident or working in 
the area and their inability to form a closed category in line with the Calpak 
test.99 The appeal to the ECJ was the only option left for Greenpeace and the 
local residents seeking to challenge the decision. 
 Before examining the judgment of the ECJ, it must be clarified that the 
findings of the Court were expressed in an unusually laconic manner whereby 
only eight short paragraphs were devoted to the examination of the arguments 
of the applicants. The ECJ, relied on the CFI’s judgment, thus it can be argued 
that the ECJ endorsed the arguments of the CFI which requires reference to 
both judgments in order to fully appreciate the reasoning applied. 
 The main argument of the applicants was that their communications to the 
Commission in terms of the lack of an Environmental Impact Study amounted 
to rights of participation that form procedural rights.100 The ECJ rejected the 
argument by highlighting the fact that the participation of Greenpeace was 
voluntary, unsolicited and not part of the formal consultation process.101 There 
was no invitation to Greenpeace to participate in the process of consultation, 
nor was there a request by the Commission to provide evidence and expert 
opinion that would have placed the organization within the contemplation of 
the decision-maker.102 In the absence of a formal element that would create 
  
 95 Ibid., para. 32. 
 96 Ibid., para. 37. 
 97 Ibid., para. 39. 
 98 Ibid., paras. 54–62. 
 99 Cases 789–790/79, Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v. 
Commission, [1980] European Court Reports, 1949. 
 100 Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council v Commission, [1998] European 
Court Reports, I-1651, para. 25. 
 101 Ibid., paras. 28–29. In Greenpeace, op. cit., note 88, the CFI reached that conclusion 
in paras. 61–63. 
 102 Stichting Greenpeace, op. cit., note 100, paras. 28–29. In Greenpeace, op. cit., note 
88, the CFI reached that conclusion in paras. 61–63. 
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participation rights, Greenpeace was not differentiated and singled out from 
the wider public in a manner that would grant standing. 
 Greenpeace’s second argument stated that the Environmental Impact 
Directive’s preamble sets as the purpose of the measure the protection of the 
public concerned,103 thus outlining the creation of a closed group of applicants 
that possessed procedural rights of participation. The ECJ rejected the argument 
on the basis that the directive’s purpose was too vague and could not be 
construed as creating a closed class of applicants that could have participation 
rights by virtue of their interest in environmental matters.104 A directive is a 
general legislative measure that differs significantly to a decision and a failure 
under a decision to follow certain procedural requirements could create a closed 
class, whereas it is incoherent to have a closed class formed from a general 
legislative measure like a directive.105  
 Greenpeace made a third related argument contending that the right to 
environmental protection ensured through environmental policies could never 
form a closed class since by definition such interests are communal and of 
such paramount importance that warrants the granting of standing for their 
protection.106 The ECJ repeated its earlier point, namely that the applicants 
lacked individual concern as defined in Plaumann and could not be distinguished 
and singled out from any other resident, worker or tourist.107 
 The decision is myopic and reflective of an inability to adjust to the 
demands created by the persistent reliance on Plaumann.108 The overall effect 
is that the Courts remained within the spirit of their interpretation of individual 
concern and the pre-existing restrictive jurisprudence, which can be seen as an 
attempt to avoid criticisms for applying double standards in favour of pressure 
groups. In response, it can be argued that interest groups are more powerful 
and organised than individual applicants therefore it would be easier for those 
associations to meet the individual concern requirements. Moreover, a different 
approach would have created a paradox where an individual was offered weaker 
  
 103 Stichting Greenpeace, op. cit., note 100, para. 22. In Greenpeace, op. cit., note 88, the 
CFI reached that conclusion in para. 56. 
 104 Stichting Greenpeace, op. cit., note 100, paras. 29–31. 
 105 Ibid. 
 106 Ibid., para. 25. 
 107 Stichting Greenpeace, op. cit., note 100, paras. 27–28. In Greenpeace, op. cit., note 
88, the CFI reached that conclusion in para. 55. 
 108 For criticism see Torrens: op. cit., Cygan: op. cit., 1002–1008; Reid, E.: Judicial 
Review and the Protection of Non-Commercial Interests in the European Community. (2001) 
1 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue1/reid1. html>.  
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protection than organised groups, thus triggering criticism for expanding the 
liberal approach to individual applicants.  
 Nonetheless, the preceding line of reasoning must be approached with 
scepticism since the wider context of the strict approach to standing for 
individual applicants needs to be considered as a relevant factor requiring the 
relaxation of rules applying to interest groups in order to address certain of the 
deficiencies of the system. Unfortunately, yet understandably as the author 
argued elsewhere,109 the ECJ refused to alter its position in the most important 
interest group case that came before it.   
 The UPA case110 represented for some an opportunity to reform the unduly 
problematic Plaumann test and to set the criteria for standing in general and 
for interest groups in specific on a completely new foundation.111 The case 
concerned UPA, a major Spanish trade association that represents the interests 
of Spanish farmers, that sought review of a Council Regulation concerning 
olive oil production aid and price caps. The ECJ stated in unequivocal terms 
that “a natural or legal person does not, under any circumstances, have stand-
ing”112 if the Plaumann conditions are not met, thus directly rejecting the 
option to create an exception. The ECJ placed the burden on the national courts 
by requiring them to ensure access to effective judicial protection through 
establishing an appropriate system of legal remedies and procedures. The duty 
under Art. 10 EC required, according to the ECJ,113 that the national courts 
should facilitate as far as possible access to a court when there is a claim of 
invalidity, by construing national rules accordingly. Therefore, the ECJ 
explained that the system of remedies is complete at the Union level and that 
the alternatives to Art. 230 EC are effective, with the obligation to ensure 
access resting with national courts.114 The decision was reaffirmed in Jègo-
  
 109 Kombos: op. cit. 
 110 Case C-50/2000 P, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council [2002] European 
Court Reports, I-6677. 
 111 Granger, M-P.: Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals 
Seeking Judicial Review of Community Acts: Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v Commission and 
Union de Pequeños Agricultores v Council. (2003) Modern Law Review, 124; Albors-
Llorens, A.: The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the 
European Court Missed the Boat? 62 (2003) Cambridge Law Journal, 72.; Craig, P.: Standing, 
Rights, and the Structure of Legal Argument. 9 (2003) European Public Law, 493.; 
Ragolle, F.: Access to Justice for Private Applicants in the Community Legal Order: recent 
(r)evolutions. 28 (2003) European Law Review, 90. 
 112 UPA, op.cit., note 110, para. 37, emphasis added. 
 113 Ibid. note 110, para. 40–42. 
 114 Ibid. note 110, para. 40–42. 
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Quèrè,115 a case that has no interest group element, and in this respect analogous 
to the UPA judgment where the standing of the trade association was considered 
in conjunction and inseparably from the general standing issue for individual 
applicants. Therefore, the UPA case focused solely on the standing according 
to Plaumann and made no reference to the distinct class of challenges by 
interest groups, thus falling outside the scope of this paper. It is suffice to say 
that the UPA case reaffirmed the approach of the ECJ that perceives interest 
groups and individual applicants as a unit under the umbrella of Plaumann. 
 In conclusion, the restrictive approach to standing of individual applicants 
seeking to challenge legislative measures at the Union level has provided the 
skeleton for the development of an equally restrictive jurisprudence in relation 
to interest groups. The agency analogy has been excluded by the ECJ and can 
not provide an effective alternative for circumventing the standing hurdles 
resulting from the Plaumann formula. However, it is submitted that the study 
of the case law relevant to interest groups offers an insight into ways in which 
such groups could create the conditions that would enable them to show the 
existence of individual concern and those conditions refer mainly to the creation 
of procedural rights expressly mentioned in and forming part of the legislative 
framework.  
 In other words, the existence of procedural rights ranging from participation 
to consultation would trigger a legitimate expectation that is essentially procedural 
and which would provide the foundation for the obtainment of individual concern. 
Representative groups can ensure the right to challenge legislative enactments 
through the medium of creating the conditions for influencing decision making 
bodies, which is in effect their driving goal. Whether the expansion of effective 
and efficient influencing for the attainment of a status of individual concern is 
the theoretically appropriate and principled manner for ensuring access to 
judicial review, is a completely different issue that would not be removed until 
the approach to standing is altered.  What is more practical is the examination 
of the possibility of having a different judicial approach based on the type of 
claim and the area that the legislative action regulates. In other words, is there 
a typological approach in relation to representative groups that creates layers 
of standing rights? If the question is affirmatively answered, one must 
examine the input of that typology in the quest for finding effective ways to 
circumvent standing restrictions for representative groups and subsequently 
individual applicants. The employment context offers an interesting paradigm 
reflecting such factors. 
 
  
 115 Case C-263/02 P, Commission v Jègo-Quèrè [2004] CMLR 12. 
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4. Representative groups in the sunshine and away from the Plaumann 
 shadow: Lessons from the employment context 
 
The Union’s interest in promoting employment is entrenched in the Treaty and 
in secondary legislation, epitomised in Art. 2 EC that refers, inter alia, to the 
promotion of a high level of employment and social protection. At a functional 
level, the promotion of employment is performed at two interrelated levels. 
First, the gradual development of legislative initiatives116 and secondly, the 
development of the “flanking policies”117 that refer to the use of structural 
instruments that aid the restructuring and repositioning of the economic 
organisation of Member States.118 The role of the European Social Fund (ESF) 
has been integral in financing the initiatives of the Union aiming to supplement 
national policies that address matters of employment. The management and 
general use of the ESF is regulated by Council Regulations119 and is subject to 
judicial review, thus safeguarding the legitimacy, accountability and financial 
control of institutional action.120 It is at this stage that Art. 230 EC becomes 
relevant and it is interesting to examine the approach of the Courts within an 
area like employment that has three specific characteristics.  
 Firstly, the allocation of funds from the ESF is primarily a political and 
economic decision founded on considerations of employment policy and long-
term economic strategic organisation. Secondly, the use of the ESF exists in 
parallel and supplements national policies because employment and social 
policies remain within the ambit of national competence,121 thus in pragmatic 
terms the application of the ESF is the corollary of complex political 
compromise.122 Thirdly, there are always economic actors with a substantial 
  
 116 See for example Council Regulation 99/1260/EC, laying down general provisions 
concerning the Structural Funds (Official Journal 1999, L 161/1) and Council Regulation 
99/1784/EC concerning the European Social Fund (Official Journal 1999, L 213/5). 
 117 Szyszczak, E.: EC Labour Law. 2000. 159. 
 118 See the excellent analysis by Skiadas, D.: Judicial Review of the Management 
of Assistance Provided by the European Social Fund for the promotion of Employment. 
6 (2002) European Integration online Papers (EIoP), <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-
001a.htm>, 1. 
 119 Council Regulation 99/1260/EC, laying down general provisions concerning the 
Structural Funds (Official Journal 1999, L 161/1) and Council Regulation 99/1784/EC 
concerning the European Social Fund (Official Journal 1999, L 213/5). 
 120 Hervey, T.: European Social Law and Policy. London, 1998. 39. 
 121 Ibid., 4. 
 122 Tsakloglou, P.: Social Policy. In: Georgakopoulos, T.–Tsakalotos, E. (eds.): Economic 
Policies of the European Union. Athens, 1996. 205, 211. 
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interest in the allocation of resources from the ESF that are willing to challenge 
Community acts. From an economic perspective, the granting of aid, the 
continuation, the suspension and the readjustment of the size of financial input 
flowing from the ESF, represent a strong incentive to recipients and applicants 
for challenging measures that impact on their financial position.123 It is within 
this framework that the judicial approach must be placed. 
 The approach of the ECJ and the CFI has been reflective of the preceding 
issues and is an illustration of economic pragmatism and judicial realism that 
contrasts with the broader jurisprudence that follows the dogmatic and prob-
lematic reasoning of Plaumann. The differences are numerous and are briefly 
examined in order to offer a complete picture of the judicial approach to 
challenges related to the ESF, before examining representative groups. 
 In the first place, the notion of a reviewable act has been broadly construed 
with the ESF context. The ERTA124 judgment that established that reviewable 
acts include any act that produces legal effects has been applied broadly in 
the context of the ESF to include exclusively the legislative acts adopted by 
the Commission. Under the ESF, the national authorities cooperate with the 
Commission in the decision making process to the extent that “shared respon-
sibility for the decisions of the Commission”125 can be assumed. However, 
the ECJ held that the final responsibility rests with the Commission,126 thus 
clarifying the identity of the body responsible for the legislative measure and 
excluding the delegation of legal responsibility to bodies that would fall 
outside the scope of Art. 230 EC.  
  
 123 Neuwahl, N.: Article 173 paragraph 4 EC: Past, Present and Possible Future. 21 
(1996) European Law Review 17, 18. 
 124 Case 22/70, ERTA, [1971] European Court Reports, 263, paras. 48–55. See also 
Joined Cases C-8/66, C-9/66, C-10/66, C-11/66, Cimenteries CBR Cementsbedrijven NV v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1967] European Court Reports, 75 (a letter is 
reviewable); C-106/96, United Kingdom v. Commission of the European Communities (re 
Poverty 4), [1998] European Court Reports, I-2729 (a press release); C-57/95, France v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1997] European Court Reports, I-1627 (a 
communication).  
 125 Assumption rebutted by Skiadas: op. cit., 3. 
 126 See C-32/95, Commission of the European Communities v. Lisrestal-Organização 
Gestão de. Restaurantes Colectivos Lda and Others, [1996] European Court Reports, I-
5373, para 29; Case T-271/94, Eugenio Branco Lda v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [1996] European Court Reports, II-749 para 39; Case T-151/95, Instituto 
Europeu de Formação Profissional Lda (INEF) v. Commission of the European Communities, 
[1997] European Court Reports, II-1541 para 36. 
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 At the same time, the ECJ has balanced its approach by appreciating the 
distinct economic character of the operation of the ESF and as a corollary it 
has safeguarded the decision-making process that is purely advisory, expertise 
based and policy oriented. An example to that effect is the internal guidelines 
adopted by the Commission concerning the net financial corrections127 whereby 
the Commission is empowered to suspend or reduce the assistance granted if 
irregularities are found on the basis of technical calculations provided by the 
internal guidelines. The challenge of the internal guidelines has been unsuccess-
ful since the ECJ128 found that the guidelines do not create rights or obligations 
for third parties and do not have produce legal effects. The same protective 
approach has been taken in relation to the reports and recommendations 
adopted by the anti-fraud bodies of the Union when examining the financial 
propriety in managing resources allocated from the ESF. The ECJ held that 
these reports are mere notifications to the national authorities and the 
Commission and produce no legal effects because it is the responsibility of the 
recipients of the reports to determine whether legal measures of recovering the 
resources should be taken.129      
 The balanced approach of the ECJ that ensured the protection of advisory 
bodies entrusted with technical matters has not extended to situations where 
the challenge of a legislative measure is made difficult because of the practice 
adopted by the Commission. Normally, the Commission issues a decision 
under the regulations that provide the legislative framework for the ESF and 
sends a letter to the national authority as a matter of notification, but without 
the actual decision enclosed. The national authorities either write to the recipient 
of the ESF assistance and inform them about the decision of the Commission 
or forward the Commission’s letter and the decision itself. Therefore, the 
recipients of ESF assistance rarely receive the actual decision of the 
Commission, thus any potential challenge will lack all the information about 
the decision and would by implication be incomplete. The ECJ has identified 
the procedural gap and provided the necessary protection to incomplete 
  
 127 In the context of Art. 24 Council Regulation 88/2052/ EEC as amended by Council 
Regulation 93/2081/EEC. 
 128 Case C-443/97, Spain v Commission, [2000] European Court Reports, I-2415, paras. 
28–36. 
 129 Case T-492/93, Nutral SpA v Commission of the European Communities, [1993] 
European Court Reports, II-1023 paras 26–29; Case C-476/93 P, Nutral SpA v Commission 
of the European Communities, [1995] European Court Reports, I-4125 paras 30–31. 
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challenges lacking information130 provided that there is evidence of the existence 
of a decision.131   
 Finally, the more favourable approach of the ECJ in the context of the ESF 
is evident in the indirect expansion of the standing for privileged applicant to 
cover regional authorities involved in the operation of the ESF.132 Moreover, 
the ECJ held that the lack of challenge to the standing of local and regional 
authorities was an important factor that pre-empted the Court from examining 
the standing of such bodies on its own initiative.133 Nonetheless, the Court 
stopped a step short from including local bodies as a matter of right in the class 
of privileged applicants by stating that the fact that the standing of regional 
bodies was intentionally not examined by the ECJ does not imply acknowl-
edgment of the challenge was brought by a legal entity equivalent to a Member 
State.134 Therefore, in the context of the ESF there is an effective, yet not formal, 
expansion of the privileged applicants’ class to include regional bodies that 
“have a vital role to play in the articulation of cohesion and integration 
policies”.135   
 In relation to private applicants, the approach of the ECJ departs from the 
Plaumann reasoning of economic unrealistic results and unduly restrictive 
narrowing of standing rights. One possible explanation, though simplistic, is 
the fact that under the legislative framework regulating the operation of the 
ESF, the Commission uses decisions and not regulations, thus limiting the scope 
of application of the measure. In other words, there is practically no danger to 
have challenge to a regulation that if successful, it could grant standing rights 
to numerous applicants. At the same time, the exclusive use of decisions 
renders the identification of potential applicants predictable and the number of 
such applicants is ab initio limited to those parties that the decision singles out. 
Therefore, within the context of the ESF the actio popularis concern of the 
ECJ and the possibility of an open ended class of applicants being formed are 
  
 130 C-157/90, Infortec-Projectos e Consultadoria Lda v Commission of the European 
Community, [1992] European Court Reports, I-3525, para 14. 
 131 C-130/91, ISAE/VP and Interdata v Commission, [1992] European Court Reports, I-
69, para 11). 
 132 Skiadas: op. cit., 6.  
 133 Joined Cases C-62/87 and C-72/87, Exécutif régional Wallon and SA Glaverbel v 
Commission, [1988] European Court Reports, 1573 para 8. 
 134 C-95/97, Région Wallone v Commission, [1997] European Court Reports, I -1787 
para 5. See similar conclusion in Besila Vika, E. and Papagiannis, D.: Contemporary 
Competences of Local Government and European Integration. Athens, 1996. 95–96. 
 135 Skiadas: op. cit., 6; Evans, A.: The EU Structural Funds. Oxford, 1999. 301. 
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excluded by the fact that the decisions are practically identifying and limiting 
the number of challengers.136  
 The jurisprudence of the ECJ shows a consistency in granting standing to 
applicants that were third parties to the decision of the Commission, but who 
can be distinguished and singled out since they were identified expressly in the 
decision.137 The direct and individual concern requirement is satisfied in this 
context in cases relating to the suspension and withdrawal of assistance138 and 
to cases relating to the granting of assistance with the beneficiaries clearly named 
in the decision.139 Moreover, the ECJ has shown a willingness to recognise in 
effect rights to legitimate expectations in situations where the Commission 
refuses to make a payment that it has previously undertaken to grant,140 
regardless of the fact that no decision granting the assistance exists. The CFI 
has applied this reasoning in the Murgia Messapica case141 where the applicant 
had previously applied for assistance and participated substantially in prolonged 
procedures for evaluation of their application by the Commission.  
 Therefore, there is a shift in the approach of the Courts within the context 
of the ESF, with an assumption in favour of granting standing and contra to the 
traditional Plaumann rationale, as evident from the case law in relation to 
competitors of the final recipient of assistance. The ECJ has ruled that such 
competitors may challenge the validity of the decision granting the assistance 
to another beneficiary if it can be established that the market position of the 
applicant has been significantly effected by the assistance granted.142 This 
generous approach must be qualified with reference to the condition that the 
competitor and the recipient are located in geographically proximity to each 
  
 136 Skiadas: op. cit., 7. 
 137 Case C-291/89, Interhotel v Commission, [1991] European Court Reports, I-2257 
para. 13; Case C-304/89, Estabelecimentos Isidoro M. Oliveira SA v Commission, [1991] 
European Court Reports, I-2283 para. 13. 
 138 Case C-181/90, Consorgan-Gestão de Empresas, Lda v Commission, [1992] European 
Court Reports, I-3557 para. 12; Case C-189/90, Cipeke-Commércio e Indústria de Papel 
Lda v Commission, [1992] European Court Reports, I-3573 para. 12. 
 139 Case T-450/93, Lisrestal-Organização Gestão de Restaurantes Colectivos Lda and 
Others v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, II-1177 paras. 45-46; Case T-85/94, 
Eugénio Branco Lda v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, II-45 paras. 25–26. 
 140 Case T-465/93, Murgia Messapica v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, 
II-361. 
 141 Ibid., para. 26.  
 142 Case C-169/84, COFAZ v Commission, [1986] European Court Reports, 391 para. 28; 
Joined Cases T-447/93, T-448/93, T-449/93 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del 
Cemento, British Cement Association, Titan Cement Company SA v. Commission, [1995] 
European Court Reports, II-1971 paras 55–56, 80. 
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other143 and the establishment by the competitor of an interest resulting from 
participation in the proceedings leading to the adopted decision.144 Consequently, 
the approach of the Courts can be seen as departing from the strict formalistic 
conditions and more importantly from the spirit of Plaumann, but the marked 
difference has failed to filter to the standing of representative groups. 
 The general conditions for representative groups that apply in general apply 
in the field of employment law. Trade associations and interests groups within 
the framework of the ESF must show that a personal interest exists in the case 
that is distinct from those of the industrial policy of the Member State 
concerned145 and that the general interest of the membership has been affected 
within the Plaumann meaning.146 Alternatively, it would suffice to show that 
the membership could have brought an action challenging the decision,147 and 
that procedural rights flowing from participation existed.148 
 Before criticising the narrower approach to the standing of representative 
groups when compared to the more liberal stand towards applicants in the 
context of the ESF, it must be noted that the case law relating to representative 
groups within the ESF is extremely limited. The reason for this is the com-
parably greater possibility for successful individual challenges that results 
from the economically orthodox approach to challenges of measures in the 
context of the ESF. Moreover, there is the example of the Murgia Messapica 
case149 where the applicants were a group of entrepreneurs set up to develop 
economic activities at the rural level, in the Italian Murgia Messapica region, 
and specifically to implement the Leader Programme launched by the Com-
  
 143 Joined Cases C-10/68, C-18/68, Eridania v Commission, [1969] European Court 
Reports, 459, 481. 
 144 Case C-264/82, Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission, [1985] European 
Court Reports, 849, paras. 12-16; Case C-169/84, COFAZ v Commission, [1986] European 
Court Reports, 391, paras. 25–26. 
 145 Case C-282/85, Comité de Développement et de Promotion du Textile et de l’ 
Habillement v. Commission, [1986] European Court Reports, 2469 para 18. 
 146 Joined Cases 16/62, 17/62, Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et 
Legumes v Council, [1962] European Court Reports, 471, 479–480; Case T-117/94, 
Associazione Agricoltori della Provincia di Rovino v Commission, [1995] European Court 
Reports, II-455 paras. 27–28. 
 147 Case T-197/95, Sveriges Betodlares Centralförening and Sven Åke Henrikson v 
Commission, [1996] European Court Reports, II-1283, para. 35. 
 148 Case C-313/90, CIRFS and others v Commission, [1993] European Court Reports, 
I-1125 paras. 29–30; Joined Cases 67,68 and 70/85, Kwekerij Gebroeders Van der Kooy 
BV and Others v. Commission, [1988] European Court Reports, 219 paras. 20–24. 
 149 Case T-465/93, Murgia Messapica v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, 
II-361. 
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mission. The group is, therefore, not a representative group in terms of either 
offering representation for its membership or pursuing the promotion of certain 
broader interests, but is rather a collective body representing specific economic 
interests relating to the funding under a project. Nonetheless, the action was 
from a group and was approached by the CFI in a favourable way whereby 
standing rights were granted due to participation in the bilateral (Italian authori-
ties and applicants) and tripartite (Italian authorities, applicants and Commission) 
discussions and assessments meetings for the proposal submitted by the 
applicants. Therefore, in this context the CFI was willing to grant standing on the 
basis of Plaumann for a group of entrepreneurs applying for funding under a 
project financed through the ESF, even if the proposal was initially selected 
but subject to numerous modifications proposed by the Commission, which 
were not undertaken by the applicants. The proposal was regarded as incomplete 
and substandard in the final assessment round, but the mere participation up to 
that stage was perceived by the CFI as creating procedural rights that satisfied 
the direct and individual concern requirement. Clearly, the judgment represents 
a significant shift from the broader approach to standing of both private 
applicants and representative groups and shows the way for a possible solution 
to the Plaumann problem. By placing the emphasis on participation, represen-
tative groups can ensure compliance with the Plaumann criteria since the ECJ 
and the CFI have shown a willingness to recognise procedural rights and a 
possible procedural legitimate expectation to challenge a legislative measure 
that has been adopted with the effective participation of the applicant. Therefore, 
representative groups could be granted standing rights under the present 
unsatisfactory legal system that is based on Plaumann and which influences 
the approach towards representative groups, if those groups manage to lobby 
there way into the legislative process. Enhanced participation and influencing 
the formation of the substance of legislative measures is the essential and core 
function of representative groups. It must now be used to target the procedural 
formation of legislative measures by ensuring that any input by representative 
groups becomes a formal part of the consultation and advisory processes, thus 
giving rise to procedural rights to participation. Therefore, the case law of the 
ECJ and the CFI leaves room for participation rights of representative groups 
that can be quite extensive as the Murgia Messapica case150 shows and the 
representative groups can take advantage to bring surrogate actions on behalf 
of their members that would not otherwise be granted standing. The key is in 
the effective lobbying practices that have to target formal recognition of 
  
 150 Case T-465/93, Murgia Messapica v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, 
II-361. 
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their role in the legislative process. Representative groups can go round the 
standing problem by simply being effective at what they are doing, namely 
lobbying. Finally, the context within which a representative group operates 
plays an important role in whether standing would be granted as does the type 
of claim that the group makes before the Court. The case law has shown that 
the use of the human rights argument, whether in the form of effective 
judicial protection or a fundamental right like environmental protection being 
threatened by the challenged legislative measure, will not be successful by 
virtue of the paramount importance of human rights. What will make the 
difference is the existence of documented participation that creates procedural 
rights and which is not the result of the group’s general activity in the field but 
part of the procedural requirement for the adoption of the measure, as the 
Greenpeace case showed. Moreover, the context of operation could be important, 
with cases brought within the contexts of state aid, competition, employment 
and social cohesion being favourably treated by the Courts, but this difficulty 
can be circumvented if the procedural rights are established in any context.151 
Therefore, there is a typology of claims and contexts in relation to the standing 
of representative groups, but the main deciding factor as regards the granting 
of standing is the effective lobbying at the procedural level leading to 
documented participation triggering procedural rights. This solution bypasses 
typologies of claims and contexts and simplifies standing for representative 
groups, which can then use surrogate actions on behalf of their membership as 
a solution to the restrictive criteria of individual concern that effectively 
exclude individual challenges.       
 
 
Epilogue 
 
The issue of locus standi performs an instrumental function in the process of 
judicial review and should act as the gateway that would distinguish between 
claims that are artificial and fabricated and claims that have a substance. In the 
Union, the regulation of standing on the basis of the Plaumann criterion has 
proved an impossible hurdle for individual applicants seeking to challenge the 
validity of a legislative measure. This regrettable outcome has filtered through 
to the challenges brought by representative groups. Consequently, the possibility 
of partially redressing the shortcomings of Plaumann through the medium of 
representative groups and the agency analogy, has been preempted by the 
reflection of the restrictive tests for individual concern to actions brought by 
  
 151 See Torrens: op. cit., Cygan: op. cit. 
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representative organizations. The ECJ’s approach and the approaches of national 
courts towards representative groups and their right to initiate challenges are 
in state of divergence. The English legal system has managed to draw a 
dichotomy between fraudulent and unfounded claims that tend to reproduce 
litigation and aim to frustrate the formation and implementation of policies, 
from genuine and helpful challenges that fill in the gaps of accountability. The 
task is not simplistic, but it has proved to be beyond the ECJ that insists on the 
monolithic argument that there is a danger of creating a flood of cases that are 
unfounded and which take advantage of a liberal stand towards the standing of 
representative groups. The real concern of the ECJ seems to be the reluctance 
to create an exception to Plaumann that in effect grants broader rights to 
representative groups than individual applicants. This legitimacy concern has 
persistently influenced the ECJ to shed the shadow of Plaumann to the standing 
of interest groups. In the quest for a solution, this paper has examined the 
possibility of having a typology of claims and fields of activity that are treated 
more favorably by the ECJ. The conclusion reached states that the use by 
representative groups of arguments that are founded on human rights, like 
effective judicial protection and the protection of the environment, is not 
creating a positive framework that could facilitate the departure from the 
Plaumann yardstick. Moreover, there seem to be no strong thematic typology 
that is sympathetically treated by the ECJ since the exceptional relaxation of 
standing requirements for interest groups can not be identified in insulated 
areas. In this respect, even in the field of environmental protection the ECJ has 
refused to adopt a more liberal approach.  
 Therefore, there is no clear thematic or argumentative typology that can be 
identified in the approach of the Court, but there seems to be a uniting thread 
that connects most of the cases where the ECJ relaxed its approach: participation. 
It is submitted that the only way to create positive conditions for standing rights 
is for the representative groups to engage in effective lobbying practices that 
target formal recognition of their role in the legislative process. The differentiating 
factor in recognising standing rights by the ECJ is the existence of documented 
participation, continuous involvement in the specific area and engagement with 
the institutions during the drafting stage. These features trigger procedural rights 
and create a legitimate expectation to be part of the review of legality process. 
Put differently, the only way to take the standing of representative groups 
away from the shadow of Plaumann, is for interest groups to be effective at 
what they are doing, namely lobbying. Whether that type of light is bright 
enough to remove the shadow entirely, it remains to be seen but it can be state 
with certainty that any light is better than the Plaumann darkness.   
